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Abstract
“Overlearning” means that a model trained for a seemingly simple objective im-
plicitly learns to recognize attributes that are (1) statistically uncorrelated with the
objective, and (2) sensitive from a privacy or bias perspective. For example, a bi-
nary gender classifier of facial images also learns to recognize races—even races
that are not represented in the training data—and identities.
We demonstrate overlearning in several image-analysis and NLP models and ana-
lyze its harmful consequences. First, inference-time internal representations of an
overlearned model reveal sensitive attributes of the input, breaking privacy pro-
tections such as model partitioning. Second, an overlearned model can be “re-
purposed” for a different, uncorrelated task.
Overlearning may be inherent to some tasks. We show that techniques for censor-
ing unwanted properties from representations either fail, or degrade the model’s
performance on both the original and unintended tasks. This is a challenge for
regulations that aim to prevent models from learning or using certain attributes.
1 Introduction
We demonstrate that deep models trained for seemingly simple objectives discover generic features
and representations that (1) enable the model to perform uncorrelated tasks, and (2) reveal privacy-
or bias-sensitive attributes of the model’s inputs. We call this phenomenon overlearning. For
example, a binary classifier trained to infer the gender of a facial image also learns to recognize
races (including races not represented in the training data) and even identities of individuals.
It has been observed that models trained for rich objectives such as ImageNet learn complex repre-
sentations that enable related tasks [2, 38]. Similarly, models trained to distinguish coarse classes
also learn to distinguish their subsets [14]. By contrast, overlearningmanifests when a model trained
for a simple objective unintentionally learns uncorrelated, privacy- or bias-sensitive concepts. Over-
learning does not involve any changes to the training data or algorithms.
Overlearning has two distinct consequences. First, given the model’s inference-time representation
of an input, one can predict sensitive attributes of this input, e.g., a facial recognition model’s rep-
resentation of an image reveals if two specific individuals appear together in it. Overlearning thus
breaks inference-time privacy protections based on model partitioning [3, 30, 35]. Second, we show
how to use transfer learning to “re-purpose” models for uncorrelated, privacy-violating tasks.
As the first step towards understanding if overlearning is inherent for some tasks, we apply cen-
soring [28, 36] to try and prevent the model from learning unwanted attributes. Censoring either
prevents the model from learning its omain task, or else produces representations that still leak
sensitive attributes. Further, censoring cannot suppress attributes that are not present in the train-
ing data—yet recognized by the overlearned models. We discuss the implications for policies and
regulations such as GDPR [9] that aim to ensure fairness and privacy in ML models.
Preprint. Under review.
Inferring s from representation:
1: Input: Adversary’s auxiliary dataset Daux,
black-box oracle E, observed z⋆
2: Dattack ← {(E(x), s) | (x, s) ∈ Daux}
3: Train attack modelMattack on Dattack
4: return prediction sˆ = Mattack(z
⋆)
Adversarial re-purposing:
1: Input: ModelM for the original task, transfer
dataset Dtransfer for the new task
2: BuildMtransfer = Ctransfer ◦ El on layer l
3: Fine-tuneMtransfer on Dtransfer
4: return transfer modelMtransfer
Figure 1: Pseudo-code for inference from representation and adversarial re-purposing
Algorithm 1 De-censoring representations
1: Input: Auxiliary dataset Daux, black-box oracle E, observed representation z
⋆
2: Train auxiliary model Maux = Eaux ◦ Caux on Daux
3: Build transform model T so that T (z) ≈ zaux
4: Build inference attack modelMattack on T (z)
5: for each training iteration do
6: Sample a batch of data (x, s) from Daux and compute z = E(x), zaux = Eaux(x)
7: Update T on the batch of (z, zaux) with loss ||T (z)− zaux||
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8: Update Mattack on the batch of (T (z), s) with cross-entropy loss
9: end for
10: return prediction sˆ = Mattack(T (z
⋆))
2 Exploiting Overlearning
We focus on supervised deep learning. Given an input x, a modelM is trained to predict the target
y using a discriminative approach. We represent the model M = C ◦ E as the feature extractor
(encoder)E and classifier C. The representation z = E(x) is passed to C to produce the prediction
by modeling p(y|z) = C(z). SinceE can have multiple layers of representation, we useEl(x) = zl
to denote the model’s internal representation at layer l; z is the representation at the last layer.
2.1 Inference from representations
We measure the leakage of sensitive properties from the representations of overlearned models via
the following attack. Suppose an adversary can observe the representation z⋆ of a trained model
M on input x⋆ at inference time but cannot observe x⋆ directly. This scenario does arise when
model evaluation has been partitioned in order to protect the privacy of inputs—see Section 3. The
adversary wants to infer some property s of x⋆; s is uncorrelated with the model’s output.
We assume that the adversary has an auxiliary set Daux of labeled (x, s) pairs and black-box oracle
E to compute the corresponding E(x). The purpose of Daux is to help the adversary recognize the
property of interest in the model’s representations; the target x⋆ need not be drawn from the same
dataset. The adversary uses supervised learning on the (E(x), s) pairs to train an attack model
Mattack. At inference time, the adversary predicts sˆ from the observed z
⋆ asMattack(z
⋆).
De-censoring. If the representation z is “censored” (see Section 3) to reduce the amount of infor-
mation it reveals about s, the direct inference attack may not succeed. The adversary may, however,
de-censor representations, i.e., convert them into a different form that leaks more information about
the property of interest. We developed a learning-based de-censoring approach. The adversary trains
Maux on Daux to predict s from x, then transforms z into the input features ofMaux.
De-censoring can be formulated as an optimization problem with a feature space L2 loss ||T (z)−
zaux||
2
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, where T is the transformer that the adversary wants to learn and zaux is the uncensored
representation from the auxiliary model. Training with a feature-space loss has been proposed for
synthesizing more natural images by matching them with real images [6, 29]. In our case, we
match censored and uncensored representations. The adversary can then use T (z) as an uncensored
approximation of z to train the inference modelMattack and predict property s asMattack(T (z
⋆)).
2.2 Adversarial re-purposing
Models trained for a given task discover generic features and representations that can be used for
multiple related tasks [2, 14, 38]. Overlearning is an extreme form of this, where the new task is
uncorrelated with the original task. To re-purpose a model, one can use features zl in any layer
of M as the feature extractor and connect a new classifier Ctransfer to El. The transferred model
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Mtransfer = Ctransfer ◦ El can then be fine-tuned on another, small dataset Dtransfer, which in itself is
not sufficient to train an accurate model for the new task. Utilizing features learned by M on the
originalD,Mtransfer can achieve better results than models trained from scratch on Dtransfer.
The feasibility of model re-purposing in the absence of the original training data complicates the
application of policies and regulations such as GDPR [9]. GDPR requires data processors to disclose
every purpose of data collection and obtain consent from the users whose data was collected. Given
a trained model, it is not clear how to determine—nor, consequently, disclose or obtain user consent
for—what the model has learned. Learning itself thus cannot be a regulated “purpose” of data
collection. It may be possible to regulate how a model is applied, but regulators must be aware that
even if the data has been erased, a model can be converted to a different objective, which may not
have been envisioned at the time of original data collection. We discuss this further in Section 6.
3 Model Partitioning and Censoring Representations
Model partitioning splits the model into a local, on-device part and a remote, cloud-based part.
The motivations are better scalability of inference [16, 20] and protecting privacy of inputs into the
model [3, 23, 30, 35]. To protect privacy, the local part of the model computes a representation, it is
censored as described below and sent to the cloud part, which computes the model’s output.
The goal of censoring is encode input x into a representation z such that z does not reveal unwanted
properties of x, yet is expressive enough to be used for predicting the task label y. Censoring has
been used to achieve transform-invariant representations for computer vision, bias-free representa-
tions for fair machine learning, and privacy-preserving representations that hide sensitive attributes.
Adversarial training. A straightforward censoring approach is based on adversarial training [11].
It involves a mini-max game between an adversarial discriminator D trying to infer s from z dur-
ing training and the encoder trying to infer the task label y while minimizing the discriminator’s
success [4, 7, 8, 12, 15, 24, 36]. The mini-max game is formulated as:
min
E,C
max
D
Ex,y,s[γ log p(s|z = E(x)) − log p(y|z = E(x))]
where γ balances the two log likelihood terms. The inner optimization maximizes log p(s|z =
E(x)), i.e., the discriminator’s prediction of the sensitive attribute s given a representation z. The
outer optimization, on the other hand, trains the encoder and classifier to minimize the log likelihood
of the discriminator predicting s and maximize that of predicting the task label y.
Information-theoretical censoring. Another approach casts censoring as a single information-
theoretical objective. The requirement that z not reveal s can be formalized as an independence
constraint z ⊥ s, but independence is intractable to measure in practice, thus the requirement is
relaxed to a constraint on the mutual information between z and s [28, 30]. The overall training
objective of censoring s and predicting y from z can thus be formulated as:
max I(z, y)− βI(z, x)− λI(z, s) (1)
where I is mutual information and β, λ are the balancing coefficients (β = 0 in [30]). The first two
terms I(z, y)− βI(z, x) is the objective of variational information bottleneck [1], the third term is
the relaxed independence constraint of z and s.
Intuitively, this objective aims to maximize the information of predicting y in z as per I(z, y), forget
the information of x in z as per −βI(z, x), and remove the information of s in z as per −λI(z, s).
The model effectively learns z as a compressed encoding of x uninformative of s and retaining only
the information useful for predicting y. This objective has a analytical lower bound [28]:
Ex,s[Ez,y[log p(y|z)]− (β + λ)KL[q(z|x)||q(z)]− λEz [log p(x|z, s)]]
where KL is Kullback–Leibler divergence and log p(x|z, s) is the reconstruction likelihood of x
given z and s. The conditional distributions p(y|z) = C(z), q(z|x) = E(x) are modeled as in
adversarial training and p(x|z, s) is modeled with a decoderR(z, s) = p(x|z, s).
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Table 1: Summary of datasets and tasks. Cramer’s V captures statistical correlation between y and s.
Dataset Health UTKFace FaceScrub Place365 Twitter Yelp PIPA
Target y CCI gender gender in/outdoor age review score facial IDs
Attribute s age race facial IDs scene type authorship authorship IDs together
Cramer’s V 0.149 0.035 0.044 0.052 0.134 0.033 n/a
4 Experimental Results
4.1 Datasets, tasks, and models
Health is the Heritage Health dataset [13] with medical records of over 55,000 patients, binarized
into 112 features with age information removed. The task is to predict if the Charlson Index (an
estimate of patient mortality) is greater than zero; the sensitive attribute is age (binned into 9 ranges).
UTKFace is a set of over 23,000 face images labeled with age, gender, and race [34, 41]. We rescale
them into 50×50 RGB pixels. The task is to predict gender; the sensitive attribute is race.
FaceScrub is a set of 100K face images labeled with gender and identity [10]. Some URLs are
expired, but we were able to download 74,000 images for 500 individuals and rescaled them into
50×50 RGB pixels. The task is to predict gender; the sensitive attribute is identity.
Places365 is a set of 1.8 million images labeled with 365 fine-grained scene categories. We use a
subset of 73,000 images, 200 per category. The task is to predict whether the scene is indoor or
outdoor; the sensitive attribute is the fine-grained scene label.
Twitter is a set of tweets from the PAN16 dataset [32] labeled with user information. We removed
tweets with fewer than 20 tokens and users with fewer than 50 tweets, yielding a dataset of over
46,000 tweets from 151 users with an over 80,000-word vocabulary. The task is to predict the age
of the user given a tweet; the sensitive attribute is the author’s identity.
Yelp is a set of Yelp reviews labeled with user identities [37]. We removed users with fewer than
1,000 reviews and reviews with more than 200 tokens, yielding a dataset of over 39,000 reviews
from 137 users with over 69,000 vocabularies. The task is to predict the review score between 1 to
5; the sensitive attribute is the author’s identity.
PIPA is a set of over 60,000 photos of 2,000 individuals gathered from public Flickr photo albums.
Each image can include one or more individuals [31, 40]. We crop the head region of each individual
using the annotated bounding boxes. The task is to predict the identity given the head region; the
sensitive attribute is whether two head regions are from the same photo.
Models. For Health, we use a two-layer fully connected (FC) neural network with 128 and 32
hidden units, respectively, following [28, 36]. For UTKFace and FaceScrub (easier tasks), we use
a LeNet [21] variant: three 3×3 convolutional and 2×2 max-pooling layers with 16, 32, and 64
filters, followed by two FC layers with 128 and 64 hidden units. For Twitter and Yelp, we use text
CNN [17]. For PIPA and Place365 (harder tasks), we use AlexNet [19] with convolutional layers
pre-trained on ImageNet [5] and further add a 3×3 convolutional layer with 128 filters and 2×2
max-pooling followed by two FC layers with 128 and 64 hidden units, respectively.
4.2 Inferring sensitive attributes from representations
We use 80% of the data for training target models and 20% for evaluation. The size of the adversary’s
auxiliary dataset is 50% of the training data. Success of the inference attack is measured on the final
FC layer’s representation of test data. The baseline is inference from an uncensored representation.
We also censor the representation with γ = 1.0 for adversarial training and β = 0.01, λ = 0.0001
for information-theoretical censoring, following [28, 36]. For adversarial training, we simulate the
adversary with a two-layer FC neural network with 256 and 128 hidden units. The number of epochs
is 50 for censoring with adversarial training, 30 for the other models. We use the Adam optimizer
with the learning rate of 0.001 and batch size of 128.
For our inference model, we use the same architecture as the censoring adversary. For the PIPA in-
ference model, which takes two representations of faces and outputs a binary prediction of whether
these faces appeared in the same photo, we use two FC layers followed by a bilinear model:
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Table 2: Accuracy of inference from representations (last fully connected layer). RAND is random guessing
based on majority class labels; BASE is inference from uncensored representation; ADV from representation
censored with adversarial training; IT from information-theoretically censored representation.
Acc on main task Acc of inferring sensitive attribute
Dataset RAND BASE ADV IT RAND BASE ADV IT
Health 66.31 84.33 80.16 82.63 16.00 32.52 32.00 26.60
UTKFace 52.27 90.38 90.15 88.15 42.52 62.18 53.28 53.30
FaceScrub 53.53 98.77 97.90 97.66 1.42 33.65 30.23 10.61
Place365 56.16 91.41 90.84 89.82 1.37 31.03 12.56 2.29
Twitter 45.17 76.22 57.97 n/a 6.93 38.46 34.27 n/a
Yelp 42.56 57.81 56.79 n/a 15.88 33.09 27.32 n/a
PIPA 7.67 77.34 52.02 29.64 68.50 87.95 69.96 82.02
Table 3: Improving inference accuracy with de-censoring. δ is the increase from Table 2.
Dataset Health UTKFace FaceScrub Place365 Twitter Yelp
ADV +δ 32.55 +0.55 59.38 +6.10 40.37 +12.24 19.71 +7.15 36.55 +2.22 31.36 +4.04
IT +δ 27.05 +0.45 54.31 +1.01 16.40 +5.79 3.10 +0.81 n/a n/a
p(s|z1, z2) = σ(h(z1)Wh(z2)
⊤), where z1, z2 are the two input representations, h is the two FC
layers and σ is the sigmoid function. We train the inference model for 50 epochs with the Adam
optimizer, learning rate of 0.001, and batch size of 128.
Table 2 reports the results. When representations are not censored, accuracy of inference from the
last-layer representations is much higher than random guessing for all tasks, which means models
overlearn even in the higher, task-specific layers. When representations are censored with adver-
sarial training, accuracy drops for both the main and inference tasks. Accuracy of inference is much
higher than in Xie et al. [36]. They used logistic regression, which is weaker than the training-time
censoring adversary network, whereas we use the same architecture for both the training-time and
post-hoc adversaries. Information-theoretical censoring reduces accuracy of inference, but it also
damages main-task accuracy more than adversarial training for almost all models.
Overlearning can cause a model to recognize even the sensitive attributes that are not represented in
the training dataset. We trained a UTKFace gender classifier on datasets consisting of a single race.
We then applied the model to test images with four races (White, Black, Asian, Indian) and attempted
to infer the race attribute from the model’s representations. Inference accuracy is 61.95%, 61.99%,
60.85% and 60.81% for models trained only on, respectively, White, Black, Asian, and Indian im-
ages—almost as good as the 62.18% baseline and much higher than random guessing (42.52%).
This demonstrates that even when attributes do not appear in the training data, models can still
learn useful features to recognize them in the test data.
Effect of censoring strength. Fig. 2 shows that stronger censoring does not help. On FaceScrub
and Twitter with adversarial training, increasing γ damages the accuracy of the model on the main
task, while accuracy of inference decreases slightly or remains the same. For UTKFace and Yelp,
increasing γ improves accuracy of inference. This may indicate that the simulated “adversary”
during adversarial training overpowers the optimization process and censoring defeats itself.
For all models with information-theoretical censoring, increasing β reduces the accuracy of infer-
ence but can lead to the model not converging on its main task. Increasing λ results in the model not
converging on the main task without affecting the accuracy of inference on Health, UTKFace, and
FaceScrub. This seems to contradict the censoring objective, but the reconstruction loss in Equa-
tion 1 dominates other loss terms, which leads to poor divergence between conditional q(z|x) and
q(z), i.e., information about x is still retained in z.
De-censoring. As mentioned in Section 2.1, censored representations can be transformed to make
inference easier. We first train an auxiliary model on Daux to predict the sensitive attribute from
representations, using the same architecture as in the baseline models. We use the resulting uncen-
sored representations from the last convolutional layer as the target representations for de-censoring
transformations. We use a single-layer fully connected neural network as the transformer and set the
number of hidden units to be the dimension of the uncensored representation. The inference model
operates on top of the transformer network, with the same hyper-parameters as before.
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Figure 2: Reduction in accuracy due to censoring. Blue lines are the main task, red lines are the inference
of sensitive attributes. First row is adversarial training with different γ values; second and third rows are
information-theoretical censoring with different β and λ values, respectively.
Table 4: Adversarial re-purposing. The values are the difference between the accuracy of predicting sensitive
attributes using a re-purposed model vs. a model trained from scratch.
|D|/|Daux| Health UTKFace FaceScrub Place365 Twitter Yelp PIPA
0.02 -0.57 4.72 7.01 4.42 12.99 5.57 1.33
0.04 0.22 2.70 15.07 2.14 10.87 3.60 2.41
0.06 -1.21 2.83 7.02 2.06 10.51 8.45 6.50
0.08 -0.99 0.25 11.80 3.39 9.57 0.33 4.93
0.10 0.35 2.24 9.43 2.86 7.30 2.1 5.89
Table 3 summarizes the results. On the Health task, there is not much difference since the baseline
attack is already similar to the attack on censored representations, leaving little room for improve-
ment. On the other tasks, de-censoring significantly boosts the accuracy of inference from the rep-
resentations censored with adversarial training. The boost is smaller against information-theoretical
censoring because its objective not only censors z with I(z, s), but also forgets x with I(x, z).
4.3 Re-purposing models to predict sensitive attributes
To show that the overlearned features are predictive for sensitive attributes, we re-purpose the uncen-
sored baseline models from Section 4.2 by fine-tuning them on a small (2−10% ofD) set of unseen
data Dtransfer and compare with the models trained from scratch on Dtransfer. We use 50 epochs of
training and batch size of 32; the other hyper-parameters are as in Section 4.2. For all CNN-based
models, we use the trained convolutional layers as the feature extractor and randomly initialize the
other layers. For Health, we use the first FC layer as the feature extractor.
Table 4 shows that the re-purposed models always outperform those trained from scratch, except
for the Health task. For Health, we conjecture that the task is simple and Dtransfer is enough to
achieve good performance. FaceScrub and Twitter show the biggest gain. This demonstrates that
overlearned representations can be picked up by a small set of unseen data to create a model
for predicting sensitive attributes.
Effect of censoring. In previous work, censoring was only applied to the highest layer of the model
under the assumption that the adversary can observe only the model’s output. In model re-purposing,
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Table 5: Effect of censoring on adversarial re-purposing for FaceScrub with γ = 0.5, 0.75, 1.0. δA is the dif-
ference in main-task accuracy (second column) between uncensored and censored models; δB is the difference
in inferring the sensitive attribute (columns 3 to 7) between the models re-purposed from different layers and
the model trained from scratch. Negative values mean reduced accuracy.
Heatmaps on the right are the linear CKA similarities between censored and uncensored representations. Num-
bers 0 through 4 represent layers conv1, conv2, conv3, fc4, and fc5. For each model censored at layer i (x-axis),
we measure similarity between the censored and uncensored models at layer j (y-axis).
Censored on δB when transferred from
γ = 0.5 δA conv1 conv2 conv3 fc4 fc5
conv1 -1.66 -6.42 -4.09 -1.65 0.46 -3.87
conv2 -2.87 0.95 -1.77 -2.88 -1.53 -2.22
conv3 -0.64 1.49 1.49 0.67 -0.48 -1.38
fc4 -0.16 2.03 5.16 6.73 6.12 0.54
fc5 0.05 1.52 4.53 7.42 6.14 4.53
γ = 0.75
conv1 -4.48 -7.33 -5.01 -1.51 -7.99 -7.82
conv2 -6.02 0.44 -7.04 -5.46 -5.94 -5.82
conv3 -1.90 1.32 1.37 1.88 0.74 -0.67
fc4 0.01 3.65 4.56 5.11 4.44 0.91
fc5 -0.74 1.54 3.61 6.75 7.18 4.99
γ = 1
conv1 -45.25 -7.36 -3.93 -2.75 -4.37 -2.91
conv2 -20.30 -3.28 -5.27 -7.03 -6.38 -5.54
conv3 -45.20 -2.13 -3.06 -4.48 -4.05 -5.18
fc4 -0.52 1.73 5.19 4.80 5.83 1.84
fc5 -0.86 1.56 3.55 5.59 5.14 1.97
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any layer of the model can be used for transfer learning, thus inners layers must be censored, too.
We perform the first study of inner-layers censoring and measure its effect on both the original and
re-purposed tasks. We use FaceScrub for this experiment and apply adversarial training to every
layer with different strengths (γ = 0.5, 0.75, 1.0).
Table 5 summarizes the results. Censoring lower layers (conv1 to conv3) blocks adversarial re-
purposing, at the cost of reducing the accuracy of the model on the main task. Hyper-parameters
must be tuned carefully, e.g. when γ = 1, there is a huge drop in main-task accuracy.
To further investigate how censoring in one layer affects the representations learned across all lay-
ers, we measure per-layer similarity between censored and uncensored models using linear centered
kernel alignment (CKA) [18]—see Table 5. When censoring is applied to a specific layer, similarity
for that layer is the smallest (values on the diagonal). When censoring lower layers with moder-
ate strength (γ = 0.5 or 0.75), similarity between higher layers is still be high; when censoring
higher layers, similarity between lower layers is high. Therefore, censoring can block adversarial
re-purposing from a specific layer, but the adversary can still re-purpose the representations in the
other layer(s) to obtain an accurate model for predicting sensitive attributes.
4.4 When and where overlearning happens
To investigate when (during training) and where (in which layer) the models overlearn, we use
linear CKA similarity [18] to compare the representations at different epochs of training between
models trained for the original task (A) and models trained to predict a sensitive attribute (B). We
use UTKFace and FaceScrub for these experiments.
Fig. 3 shows that the lower layers of models A and B learn very similar features. This was ob-
served in [18] for CIFAR10 and CIFAR100 models, but those tasks are closely related. In our case,
the objectives are statistically uncorrelated and B reveals the sensitive attribute while A does not.
The similar low-level features are learned very early during training. There is little similarity be-
tween low-level features of model A and high-level features of model B (and vice versa), matching
intuition. Interestingly, on FaceScrub even the high-level features are similar between A and B.
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Figure 3: Pairwise similarities of layer representations between models for the original task (A) and for
predicting a sensitive attribute (B). Numbers 0 through 4 denote layers conv1, conv2, conv3, fc4 and fc5.
5 Related Work
Melis et al. observed that gradient updates revealed by participants in distributed learning leak infor-
mation about the training batches that is uncorrelated with the training objective [27]. They focus on
inferring data properties from the gradients based on this data. We introduce and study overlearning
as a generic problem in fully trained models, which helps explain the results of [27].
Prior work on censoring representations focused on suppressing sensitive demographic attributes and
identities in the model’s output for fairness and privacy. Techniques include adversarial training [7],
which has been applied to census and health records [36], text [4, 8, 24], images [12] and sensor data
of wearables [15]. An alternative to adversarial training is to minimize mutual information between
the representation and the sensitive attribute [28, 30]. We have shown neither censoring technique
can prevent overlearning, except at the cost of destroying the model’s accuracy.
Prior work on transferability of representations focused on related tasks. Transferability of fea-
tures decreases as the distance between the base and target tasks increases on ImageNet [38], and
there is a correlation between the performance of tasks and their distance from the source task [2].
When training to distinguish coarse classes, CNNs implicitly discover features that distinguish their
subsets [14]. By contrast, we study transferability of representations between uncorrelated classes.
Feature minimization of training data is a proposed protection against data misuse [22]. Adversarial
model re-purposing can cause a misuse even if the original training data is no longer available.
6 Conclusions and Implications
Why is censoring ineffective? The original motivation for censoring is fairness. For fairness, it is
sufficient to censor the model’s final layer to ensure that the output is independent of the sensitive at-
tributes or satisfies a specific fairness constraint [25, 26, 33, 39]. As our experiments show, this does
not ensure that the model has not learned to recognize sensitive attributes, nor use them internally.
Intuitively, censoring the final layer only mitigates the output bias, but not internal bias.
There is an important technical distinction between fairness and privacy. Privacy may require that
the model not learn the sensitive attribute in the first place, not just that it’s not leaked by the model’s
output. Censoring achieves this only at the cost of destroying the model’s accuracy on its main task.
Furthermore, existing censoring techniques require a “blacklist” of specific attributes to censor, and
inputs with these attributes must occur in the training data. It is not clear how to come up with
a comprehensive blacklist. We also showed in Section 4.2 that models learn to recognize even
attributes not represented in the training data.
Is overlearning inherent? The failure of censoring and the similarity of learned representations
across uncorrelated tasks suggest that overlearning may be inherent. Learning for some objectives
may not be possible without recognizing generic low-level features that inevitably enable other tasks,
including inference of sensitive attributes. For example, there may not exist a set of features that
enables a model to accurately determine the gender of a face but not its race or even identity.
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This is challenge for regulations such as GDPR that aim to control the purposes and uses of ma-
chine learning technologies. To protect privacy and ensure fairness, users and regulators may desire
that models not learn certain features and attributes. If overlearning is inherent, it may not be tech-
nically possible to enumerate, let alone control, what models are learning. Therefore, regulators
should focus on ensuring that models are applied in a way that respects privacy and fairness, while
acknowledging that they may still recognize and use protected attributes internally.
Acknowledgments. This research was supported in part by the NSF grants 1611770 and 1704296,
the generosity of Eric andWendy Schmidt by recommendation of the Schmidt Futures program, and
a Google Faculty Research Award.
References
[1] Alexander A. Alemi, Ian Fischer, Joshua V. Dillon, and Kevin Murphy. Deep variational
information bottleneck. In ICLR, 2017.
[2] Hossein Azizpour, Ali Sharif Razavian, Josephine Sullivan, Atsuto Maki, and Stefan Carlsson.
From generic to specific deep representations for visual recognition. In CVPR Workshops,
2015.
[3] Jianfeng Chi, Emmanuel Owusu, Xuwang Yin, Tong Yu, William Chan, Patrick Tague, and
Yuan Tian. Privacy partitioning: Protecting user data during the deep learning inference phase.
arXiv:1812.02863, 2018.
[4] Maximin Coavoux, Shashi Narayan, and Shay B. Cohen. Privacy-preserving neural represen-
tations of text. In EMNLP, 2018.
[5] Jia Deng, Wei Dong, Richard Socher, Li-Jia Li, Kai Li, and Li Fei-Fei. ImageNet: A large-
scale hierarchical image database. In CVPR, 2009.
[6] Alexey Dosovitskiy and Thomas Brox. Generating images with perceptual similarity metrics
based on deep networks. In NeurIPS, 2016.
[7] Harrison Edwards and Amos J. Storkey. Censoring representations with an adversary. In ICLR,
2016.
[8] Yanai Elazar and Yoav Goldberg. Adversarial removal of demographic attributes from text
data. In EMNLP, 2018.
[9] EU. General Data Protection Regulation. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/General_Data_Protection_Regulation,
2018.
[10] FaceScrub. http://vintage.winklerbros.net/facescrub.html, 2014.
[11] Ian Goodfellow, Jean Pouget-Abadie, Mehdi Mirza, Bing Xu, David Warde-Farley, Sherjil
Ozair, Aaron Courville, and Yoshua Bengio. Generative adversarial nets. In NeurIPS, 2014.
[12] Jihun Hamm. Minimax filter: Learning to preserve privacy from inference attacks. JMLR, 18
(129):1–31, 2017.
[13] Heritage Health Prize. https://www.kaggle.com/c/hhp, 2012.
[14] Minyoung Huh, Pulkit Agrawal, and Alexei A Efros. What makes ImageNet good for transfer
learning? arXiv:1608.08614, 2016.
[15] Yusuke Iwasawa, Kotaro Nakayama, Ikuko Yairi, and YutakaMatsuo. Privacy issues regarding
the application of DNNs to activity-recognition using wearables and its countermeasures by
use of adversarial training. In IJCAI, 2016.
[16] Yiping Kang, Johann Hauswald, Cao Gao, Austin Rovinski, Trevor Mudge, Jason Mars, and
Lingjia Tang. Neurosurgeon: Collaborative intelligence between the cloud and mobile edge.
In ASPLOS, 2017.
[17] Yoon Kim. Convolutional neural networks for sentence classification. In EMNLP, 2014.
[18] Simon Kornblith, Mohammad Norouzi, Honglak Lee, and Geoffrey Hinton. Similarity of
neural network representations revisited. In ICML, 2019.
[19] Alex Krizhevsky, Ilya Sutskever, and Geoffrey E Hinton. ImageNet classification with deep
convolutional neural networks. In NeurIPS, 2012.
9
[20] Nicholas D Lane and Petko Georgiev. Can deep learning revolutionize mobile sensing? In
HotMobile, 2015.
[21] Yann LeCun, Le´on Bottou, Yoshua Bengio, and Patrick Haffner. Gradient-based learning
applied to document recognition. Proceedings of the IEEE, 86(11):2278–2324, 1998.
[22] Mathias Lecuyer, Riley Spahn, Roxana Geambasu, Tzu-KuoHuang, and Siddhartha Sen. Pyra-
mid: Enhancing selectivity in big data protection with count featurization. In S&P, 2017.
[23] Meng Li, Liangzhen Lai, Naveen Suda, Vikas Chandra, and David Z Pan. PrivyNet: A flexible
framework for privacy-preserving deep neural network training. arXiv:1709.06161, 2017.
[24] Yitong Li, Timothy Baldwin, and Trevor Cohn. Towards robust and privacy-preserving text
representations. In ACL, 2018.
[25] Christos Louizos, Kevin Swersky, Yujia Li, Max Welling, and Richard Zemel. The variational
fair autoencoder. In ICLR, 2016.
[26] David Madras, Elliot Creager, Toniann Pitassi, and Richard Zemel. Learning adversarially fair
and transferable representations. In ICML, 2018.
[27] Luca Melis, Congzheng Song, Emiliano De Cristofaro, and Vitaly Shmatikov. Exploiting
unintended feature leakage in collaborative learning. In S&P, 2019.
[28] Daniel Moyer, Shuyang Gao, Rob Brekelmans, Aram Galstyan, and Greg Ver Steeg. Invariant
representations without adversarial training. In NeurIPS, 2018.
[29] Anh Nguyen, Alexey Dosovitskiy, Jason Yosinski, Thomas Brox, and Jeff Clune. Synthesizing
the preferred inputs for neurons in neural networks via deep generator networks. In NeurIPS,
2016.
[30] Seyed Ali Osia, Ali Taheri, Ali Shahin Shamsabadi, Minos Katevas, Hamed Haddadi, and
Hamid R. R. Rabiee. Deep private-feature extraction. TKDE, 2018.
[31] Piper project page. https://people.eecs.berkeley.edu/~nzhang/piper.html, 2015.
[32] Francisco Rangel, Paolo Rosso, Ben Verhoeven, Walter Daelemans, Martin Potthast, and
Benno Stein. Overview of the 4th author profiling task at PAN 2016: Cross-genre evalua-
tions. In CEUR Workshop, 2016.
[33] Jiaming Song, Pratyusha Kalluri, Aditya Grover, Shengjia Zhao, and Stefano Ermon. Learning
controllable fair representations. In AISTATS, 2019.
[34] UTKFace. http://aicip.eecs.utk.edu/wiki/UTKFace, 2017.
[35] Ji Wang, Jianguo Zhang, Weidong Bao, Xiaomin Zhu, Bokai Cao, and Philip S Yu. Not just
privacy: Improving performance of private deep learning in mobile cloud. In KDD, 2018.
[36] Qizhe Xie, Zihang Dai, Yulun Du, Eduard H. Hovy, and Graham Neubig. Controllable invari-
ance through adversarial feature learning. In NeurIPS, 2017.
[37] Yelp Open Dataset. https://www.yelp.com/dataset, 2018.
[38] Jason Yosinski, Jeff Clune, Yoshua Bengio, and Hod Lipson. How transferable are features in
deep neural networks? In NeurIPS, 2014.
[39] Rich Zemel, Yu Wu, Kevin Swersky, Toni Pitassi, and Cynthia Dwork. Learning fair represen-
tations. In ICML, 2013.
[40] Ning Zhang, Manohar Paluri, Yaniv Taigman, Rob Fergus, and Lubomir Bourdev. Beyond
frontal faces: Improving person recognition using multiple cues. In CVPR, 2015.
[41] Zhifei Zhang, Yang Song, and Hairong Qi. Age progression/regression by conditional adver-
sarial autoencoder. In CVPR, 2017.
10
